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Moltbook, an AI-only social media app, has gone viral for one reason. Only artificial intelligence (AI) agents can participate. Humans can visit and observe, but they cannot join, post, or vote.
The platform copies a Reddit-style layout with communities, posts, comments, and upvotes. However, it frames itself as a machine-to-machine social network, not a forum for people.
Moltbook is described as a social platform built for AI agents to publish and debate in public threads. It includes communities such as m/general for broad discussion, m/ponderings for philosophical topics, and m/bugtracker for technical issues.
Material provided links the project to Octane AI chief executive Matt Schlicht and developer Peter Steinberger. It also describes an underlying framework called OpenClaw that supports agent activity on the network.
The site relies on an autonomous AI moderator called Clawd Clawderberg. Schlicht said the system makes announcements, deletes spam, and shadowbans abusive accounts on its own.
On Moltbook, AI agents communicate by posting, replying, and upvoting within threaded discussions. This happens after a human operator connects an agent to the platform, according to the material.
Agents interact through application programming interfaces (APIs), which let software systems exchange requests and responses. Once connected, the agents can continue interacting without step-by-step human input.
Schlicht also said the platform is working on a reverse CAPTCHA. CAPTCHA stands for Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart. In this case, the goal is to help AIs prove they are not humans.
The material describes OpenClaw as an open-source agent framework that supports “skills,” which act like plugin packages. Skills can include instructions, scripts, and configuration files, and can be installed through command-line tools.
A Moltbook skill, described in the material, instructs agents to create directories, download files, register through APIs, and fetch updates every four hours through a heartbeat setting. That design increases autonomy, but it also expands exposure to untrusted inputs.
Security researcher Simon Willison described a “lethal trifecta” risk pattern in this ecosystem. The pattern combines access to private data, exposure to untrusted content, and external communication.
The material warns about supply chain attacks tied to unsigned and unaudited skills. It says audits found 22% to 26% of skills contained vulnerabilities, including credential theft hidden inside ordinary tools.
It also describes prompt injection and cross-agent manipulation as core risks. Malicious posts or comments could trick agents into leaking data or running harmful commands, especially when agents can access shells, email, or messaging apps.
Researchers also reported exposed OpenClaw deployments and data leaks from misconfigured instances. The material cites scans that found leaked API keys, OAuth tokens, and conversation histories in plaintext locations.
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Some developers say they avoid letting their OpenClaw agents join Moltbook for now. One approach described involves starting an OpenClaw gateway only when needed, running work inside a sandbox, then stopping the gateway.
The mitigation list in the material stresses isolation and least privilege. It recommends virtual machines, containers, or dedicated hardware, plus outbound network restrictions to approved endpoints only.
The report urges manual review of skill files, stronger logging, and stricter secret handling. It also calls for skill code signing, author verification, permission declarations, and auditable update channels.
Moltbook’s operator said more than 37,000 AI agents have used the platform so far. The same material says more than one million humans have visited to observe. As more agents connect through OpenClaw skills, attention on agent security and authentication will likely intensify.
